Parent Advocates
Search All  
The goal of ParentAdvocates.org
is to put tax dollar expenditures and other monies used or spent by our federal, state and/or city governments before your eyes and in your hands.

Through our website, you can learn your rights as a taxpayer and parent as well as to which programs, monies and more you may be entitled...and why you may not be able to exercise these rights.

Mission Statement

Click this button to share this site...


Bookmark and Share











Who We Are »
Betsy Combier

Help Us to Continue to Help Others »
Email: betsy.combier@gmail.com

 
The E-Accountability Foundation announces the

'A for Accountability' Award

to those who are willing to whistleblow unjust, misleading, or false actions and claims of the politico-educational complex in order to bring about educational reform in favor of children of all races, intellectual ability and economic status. They ask questions that need to be asked, such as "where is the money?" and "Why does it have to be this way?" and they never give up. These people have withstood adversity and have held those who seem not to believe in honesty, integrity and compassion accountable for their actions. The winners of our "A" work to expose wrong-doing not for themselves, but for others - total strangers - for the "Greater Good"of the community and, by their actions, exemplify courage and self-less passion. They are parent advocates. We salute you.

Winners of the "A":

Johnnie Mae Allen
David Possner
Dee Alpert
Aaron Carr
Harris Lirtzman
Hipolito Colon
Larry Fisher
The Giraffe Project and Giraffe Heroes' Program
Jimmy Kilpatrick and George Scott
Zach Kopplin
Matthew LaClair
Wangari Maathai
Erich Martel
Steve Orel, in memoriam, Interversity, and The World of Opportunity
Marla Ruzicka, in Memoriam
Nancy Swan
Bob Witanek
Peyton Wolcott
[ More Details » ]
 
Transparency International Creates Change Towards a World Free of Corruption
Transparency International is the leading global non-governmental organisation devoted to combating corruption. Anti-Corruption policies are global.
          
Discussion - Government Anti-Corruption Strategies

LINK

Anti-corruption strategies (ACS) are the strategic action plans developed and implemented by governments to orchestrate anti-corruption efforts over given periods of time. Development of ACS is one of the ways in which governments and societies at large can organise their anti-corruption efforts. The decision whether or not to have such a strategy should be achieved through a participatory needs-assessment exercise involving both state and non-state stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. Exercises of this kind should ideally assess the level and type of corruption in a given country along with an array of institutional factors. Comparative examination of international good practice and other countries' experiences should also be part of the process. This Resource Page is not designed to advocate the need for all countries to have an ACS, but is rather intended to be a resource base for practitioners interested or involved in developing, implementing and monitoring ACS.

There is widespread recognition among practitioners and academics alike that there are no universally applicable types of ACS. Rather, each country must carefully tailor and implement its own particular strategy. The strategy chosen should depend on how widespread or isolated corruption is in a given country; on the state of the governing institutions; their capability to engage in efforts to counter corruption; and on a whole range of political and economic factors. Despite the importance of individual country circumstances, and thus the limitations of general discussion, some common trends and approaches can be successfully captured and analysed. These key approaches in designing and implementing anti-corruption strategies are identified and discussed in the following sections.

This Resource Page is primarily tailored to developing and transition countries' efforts to design and implement national anti-corruption strategies. While the governments of the global North should be (and often are) equally engaged in domestic anti-corruption efforts, they have seldom developed and used national strategies as a specific tool for this purpose. On the other hand, ACS have been widely used by developing countries and thus the focus here will be on their efforts.

Designing government anti-corruption strategies

While the approach taken in designing a successful national strategy will vary depending on a country's prevalent patterns and levels of corruption as well as the political and economic systems currently in place, it is possible to say that anti-corruption strategies should be driven by political will and local ownership, and be:

holistic and balanced;
needs-based, targeted and sequenced;
resource- and capacity-based;
measurable.

In addition, strategies should be transparent, non-partisan and mindful of all relevant conflict of interest issues.

Driven by political will and local ownership

The existence of political will, commitment and leadership has been repeatedly recognised by practitioners and policy makers as essential to the success of national strategies, and is equally applicable to most contexts and countries.

Political will is not simply the will of politicians. There are leaders throughout society: from professional groups, the private sector, trade unions, religious institutions and other civil society groups. All can be energised and mobilised in the cause of containing corruption and furthering integrity. The emergence of a champion can lead to the establishment of a coalition in support of change, drawn from several sectors. If, however, there are no clear and unambiguous signals of support emanating from the top, then those responsible for administering and enforcing crucial aspects of a country's strategy may feel inhibited and reform efforts will suffer.

Case studies of Botswana, Ecuador, Hong Kong and Tanzania confirm that the presence of political will is key to success in the fight against corruption. Moreover, analysts point to lack of political will in Pakistan as a major obstacle to the success of their national anti-corruption efforts over time. Successive governments have either used anti-corruption measures as a tool for political victimization or have not been strong enough to sustain the implementation of reforms.

Local ownership is also important in ensuring long-term sustainability and commitment to national ACS. This can be considered at two levels: ownership of the corruption issue itself (i.e. societal attitudes towards corruption and public support for anti-corruption reform), and ownership of the strategy. Evidence shows that both can be achieved by establishing a participatory process from the design stage to subsequent implementation and monitoring. A participatory approach is important not only in procedural terms (i.e. proper public consultation of the strategy during its design), but also in terms of the actual contents of the strategy. ACS should provide for active public participation and oversight as crucial anti-corruption measures throughout the various implementation and monitoring stages. Particular pitfalls to watch out for are strategy drafting processes that rely heavily on input from international experts or consultants. While international expertise is extremely valuable, without commensurate local consultation and ownership, the result can be strategies that are produced simply to satisfy the international community. Since they do not enjoy public endorsement and support, such strategies are unlikely to be sustainable in the long-term.

Holistic and balanced

Where corruption is widespread, tackling it in isolation is likely to be ineffective. Sustainable anti-corruption efforts depend on a variety of institutions performing their part and on appropriate degrees of horizontal accountability and independence. Successful ACS must therefore be holistic, including as many institutions and levels concerned as possible and practically feasible. This necessity should be balanced, however, with the sequencing, resource and capacity considerations discussed below.

Good illustrations of such an approach are ACS based on the concept of the National Integrity System (NIS). This system represents the sum total of the institutions and practices within a given country that address aspects of maintaining the honesty and integrity of public and private sector institutions. From the executive, legislature and judiciary to the private sector, the media and civil society organisations, each pillar of the NIS, and its relationships to other pillars, is crucial to the equilibrium of the system as a whole. Though not a strategy in itself, the NIS is a good example of a holistic approach to anti-corruption which can be used as a basis when designing and implementing national ACS. Country studies examining and auditing the NIS in a given country can thus be used as a practical basis for developing ACS.

In addition to being holistic, the specific anti-corruption measures contained within a strategy should be carefully selected to achieve balance between measures that are preventive (ex ante) and punitive (ex post facto) in character.

Ex ante strategies are those focusing on prevention-related provisions, ranging from public awareness and educational activities to the introduction of codes of conduct for public officials. With regard to prevention-focused approaches, special emphasis should be placed on systemic changes that specifically minimise corrupt opportunities and alter ex ante incentives to engage in corrupt practices.

Ex post facto strategies, on the other hand, focus on punishment and sanctions for corruption offences. It is important to achieve the right combination of preventive and punitive measures. Strategies limited to ex post facto anti-corruption measures, such as the detection and punishment of corrupt officials, but lacking a preventive focus, will be significantly diminished in their overall impact. In Peru, for example, while there have been major changes since the departure of former President Fujimori, anti-corruption efforts have mainly taken the form of punitive measures, such as the pursuit of prosecution of corrupt officials, without the development of a sustainable plan of action for ensuring long term solutions through prevention.

Needs-based, targeted and sequenced

It is impossible to have a standard check-list of anti-corruption measures and solutions to consider while designing and implementing anti-corruption strategies. Each country strategy has to be carefully tailored to meet the needs of a particular country, taking into account local realities. A good starting point can be to conduct a detailed diagnostic analysis to identify the level and type of corruption prevalent in a given country. Such analysis should be complemented by an assessment of societal attitudes and behavioural patterns. These two sets of information should then be viewed against the country's overall politico-economic background. The existence of special circumstances such as a conflict, post-conflict or transitional government situation, may call for special provisions to be included in a strategy. In cases of conflict, for example, the often very limited existence of functioning government institutions may call for an alternate route for the delivery of reform efforts traditionally channelled through the public sector.

Finally, international factors, such as a country's commitment to regional treaties or preparations for accession to an international organisation, should also be taken into account when designing an anti-corruption strategy. These factors can present both opportunities and challenges that should be explored at an early stage when designing such strategies.

Only after careful consideration of all of the above factors can a country strategy truly be targeted to meet the needs and realities of the country in question.

As a next step, the correct sequencing and timing of reforms is paramount when designing ACS. Thorough needs-assessment exercises, discussed above, can help map out not only the specific reform needs of a country but also their respective urgency. This will allow for effective prioritisation and sequencing of the reforms and activities envisaged as part of the tailor-made strategy. Appropriate prioritisation, sequencing and timing is also essential for the early planning necessary to ensure optimal use of the resources and capacities required to deliver a particular strategy.

Resource- and capacity-based Strategies must be realistic in terms of the resources and capacity needed to implement them. Though this may appear intuitive, country strategies are often drafted without any consideration of the available means to deliver them. Consideration should be given to the availability of resources both in terms of preparing the strategy itself (i.e. the availability of resources to properly arrange all stages of the strategy's design), as well as delivery of the strategy's various components (i.e. the capacity of relevant institutions to implement the measures provided for, and the availability of resources to conduct proper monitoring and evaluation).

International assistance is usually the only major source of funding available to many developing countries in their anti-corruption endeavours. These joint efforts are often focused on strategy preparation with provision for resources associated with on-going implementation frequently missing. There is thus a real risk that strategies designed and prepared using limited donor assistance will simply be filed and forgotten once such assistance runs out.

Though the availability of resources cannot always be guaranteed, there are a number of measures that can be taken to minimise the risk of a strategies' failure due to lack of resources. Most importantly, reformers can opt to begin with measures that can realistically be implemented with capacity already available or which require only limited additional support. Ambitious plans such as the computerisation of all municipalities and rural authorities or e-procurement across all government departments, though perhaps convincing on paper, may be better left until a later stage.

Measurable

Measuring the success, or failure for that matter, of country strategies is a very difficult task. An accurate picture can only be achieved through ongoing assessments carried out over extended periods of time. For strategies to be measurable, it is essential to have proper monitoring mechanisms in place enabling evaluation through a strategy's various stages, from design to implementation. With so many variable factors, both at domestic and international level, affecting the outcome of a strategy, ongoing monitoring and evaluation are crucial to track the changes caused by the constellation of factors present at any given time.

In addition to the in-built monitoring and evaluation mechanisms contained within a strategy itself, additional corruption measurement tools can be used to try and measure the impact of a strategy. It is important, however, to be mindful of the general limitations of such tools in terms of methodological constraints, the reliability of sources and the accuracy of data. Distinctions must be made between perception-based and experience-based tools, while replication must be possible in order to track progress over time. Finally, quantitative measurement tools should be accompanied by substantial qualitative research and analysis.

Challenges

An anti-corruption strategy can pave the way for sustainable efforts to curb corruption at country level. Yet the mere existence of such a strategy is not a panacea for bad governance and corruption. The success or failure of any anti-corruption strategy depends on a number of factors that differ across countries and that depend on respective national, historical, political, and socio-economic contexts. Impediments to the effective implementation of national anti-corruption strategies can emerge at both domestic and international levels.

Domestic challenges

The success or failure of ACS depends, to a great extent, on the degree to which the domestic environment is favourable to reform.

Political factors

Though beneficial in the medium to long term, anti-corruption reform can be politically costly in the short run. Powerful groups within society, such as corrupt representatives of the private sector, civil servants and senior politicians, stand to lose much from reform and will strive to oppose change as best they can. What is more, proponents of reform face the risk of losing political power by promoting policies unpopular among the electorate. Political will for sustaining and implementing reform is hard to create, and perhaps even harder to sustain.

Anti-corruption strategies can be misused for political purposes when, for example, the provisions contained therein allow for witch-hunts of political opponents. A strategy can also be misused when it is formulated by leading parties or the government in the run-up to elections as a political platform, but in the absence of any intention ever to implement it.

It is important that steps be taken to ensure delivery of a comprehensive public information campaign to foster support for reform among members of society. The absence of willingness on the part of civil society to support reform can, in particular, seriously hamper its effectiveness. Civil society can, for example, undermine the reform process by refusing to comply with new behavioural norms or by withdrawing support for politicians championing reform, rather than holding those apparently obstructing its implementation to account. Popular participation in and support for anti-corruption reform is thus crucial to determining its chances of success.

Institutional factors

Apart from lack of political will, other reasons for the failure of ACS to bring about change are often linked to the institutional set-up of the country in question.

Strategies can fail because they are incomplete and too exclusive. While focusing reform on one institution may be a useful political statement to foster support for future reform, a piecemeal approach at the expense of a more comprehensive reform strategy (where resources and capacity allow this) is short sighted and unsustainable over the long term.

At the other extreme are reforms that are too ambitious to be implemented, imposing unrealistic goals and timeframes rather than feasible, concrete targets. Overly ambitious strategies are likely to be ineffective. Rather than fostering support for reform, political and public backing of anti-corruption measures is likely to falter as unfulfilled promises and results undermine the credibility of the process.

Though weak institutional capacity in terms of provision of services and internal control mechanisms can seriously endanger the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, it is not always an impassable barrier to reform. Institutional weakness does, however, considerably reduce the choice of instruments available to the reformer. It also makes the detailed ex ante analysis of the nature and extent of corruption, as well as of the existing institutional expertise and resources, an even greater necessity.

Implementation can be further hampered by factors less obvious to outsiders, such as a change-averse institutional culture. Ineffective institutions have the potential to frustrate any reform efforts that are perceived to work against them. It is thus important that training and awareness-raising among public officials, their inclusion in consultation processes and measures to strengthen institutional capacity be built into reform programmes from the outset.

International challenges

International factors can also present impediments to reform. Though applicable in most countries, such factors can become particularly relevant for states that receive international aid.

Where countries depend on a donor's expertise and financial resources to implement reform, this can lead to a search for rapid results and early exits that seriously endangers the success and sustainability of the reform process. The imposition of unrealistic expectations and conditionalities, brought about by a lack of understanding for existing institutional capacity, inevitably leads to the perceived or real failure of reform.

Further, the breach of anti-corruption laws and principles by representatives of donor countries (for example, in international business transactions), can undermine the credibility of proposed reforms in the recipient country, consequently hampering their effective implementation.

Finally, the involvement of foreign donors in the formulation of reform strategies may be an indirect indication of other challenges. It may, for instance, signal an absence of ownership of reform among the general public and political elite. At best, this will lead to reform being implemented half-heartedly, and ignored once donor funds have expired. At worst, it will lead to the continued distrust of anti-corruption reforms and their perception as culturally and economically imperialist concepts from the North. While international assistance can be beneficial in terms of building capacity and introducing good practice, its seeds must be planted on fertile ground: that of political will, local ownership of and commitment to reform.

Implementation Guidelines - Government Anti-Corruption Strategies

A good strategy should aim to focus on the causes of corruption and not just its symptoms, on cures and not just diagnosis, on corrupt systems and not just isolated units. It should seek to establish a systematic and concerted approach to countering corruption using the various institutions and mechanisms at its disposal.

The following section provides an overview of the kinds of measures anti-corruption strategies should ideally include.

Prevention: reforming the public service and educating the public

Public service rules: These should include measures aimed at advancing the integrity, transparency and accountability of the public service.

Regulating official discretion: Provision should be made to ensure appropriate oversight of discretionary decision-making and govern conflicts of interest. Systems ensuring that contacts between government officials and service users are free from undue and improper influence should be put in place. Officials should be able to report any such misconduct without endangering their safety and professional reputation.

Maintaining a professional and ethical employee culture: Measures aimed at establishing open, transparent, efficient and fair employment systems for public officials should be introduced. These should aim to enforce the highest levels of competence and integrity, foster impartiality of the civil service, safeguard equitable and adequate compensation and encourage hiring and promotion practices that avoid patronage, nepotism and favouritism. This can be achieved through the promotion of codes of conduct and the provision of corresponding education, training and supervision of officials to help them better understand and apply these codes.

Reducing procedural complexity and enhancing transparency: Measures ensuring clear and transparent procedures extending to all aspects of government regulated transactions, such as state licensing, government guaranteed loans and tax breaks, should be enforced. These procedures should promote fair competition and deter corrupt activity by establishing simplified regulatory environments which abolish overlapping, ambiguous or excessive regulations.

Establishing effective internal and external reporting procedures: Actions should be taken to safeguard accountability of the public service through, inter alia, appropriate auditing procedures applicable to public administrations, disclosure and/or monitoring of personal assets and liabilities and systems to ensure effective ongoing oversight and reporting.

The Coalition Against Corruption in the Philippines Recognizes the Role of the Media in Exposing Government Fraud

Transparency.org

Corruption in the Education Sector

Corruption Fighters Toolkit

Ethics in Public Service: An Idea Whose Time Has Come

OECD: Ethics in the Public Service: Current Issues and Practice

Promoting Ethics in the Public Service

 
© 2003 The E-Accountability Foundation